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Abstract. Ambient Intelligence (AmI) will introduce large privacy risks.
Stored context histories are vulnerable for unauthorized disclosure, thus
unlimited storing of privacy-sensitive context data is not desirable from
the privacy viewpoint. However, high quality and quantity of data enable
smartness for the AmI, while less and coarse data benefit privacy. This
raises a very important problem to the AmI, that is, how to balance the
smartness and privacy requirements in an ambient world. In this article,
we propose to give to donors the control over the life cycle of their con-
text data, so that users themselves can balance their needs and wishes
in terms of smartness and privacy.
1 Introduction
A smart, anticipating, and learning environment will have a great impact on pri-
vacy. Ambient Intelligence will be everywhere, is invisible, has powerful sensing
capabilities, and most of all has a memory [1]. One of the main difficulties with
privacy in the ubiquitous computing, is the way how data is collected. When
making a transaction with a web shop, it could be quite clear which kind of data
is exchanged. Ubiquitous computing techniques however, such as small sensors,
active badges [2], or cameras equipped with powerful image recognizing algo-
rithms, often collect data when people are not aware of it [3, 4]. In that case it is
possible that people think they are in a closed private area (such as coffee rooms),
but in reality they could be monitored by sensors in that room without being
aware of it. This leads to asymetric information [3]. Xiaodong et al state that
the presence of asymmetric information is the heart of the information privacy
problem in ubiquitous computing. In environments with significant asymmetry
between the information knowledge of donor and collector, negative side effects
as privacy violations are much harder to overcome.
Several techniques have been proposed in the literature which let donors
of the data specify privacy policies, in order to give control about their data
to the owners of that data [5, 6]. Although such policies are rich enough to
let people control who, when, how long, and what kind of information can be
disclosed to specific applications, enforcing those policies is usually done through
access control. Only relying on access control mechanisms to protect against
unauthorized disclosure of data, is not sufficient enough in terms of privacy
protection [7, 8]. Perhaps the context databases can be trusted now, but they
might not be in the future (due to the change of privacy regulation laws for
example). Therefore, limited retention techniques are highly desirable to prevent
large context histories to be disclosed.
A second problem of traditional privacy policies found in the literature is
that they only provide means to express privacy wishes for specific applications.
Usage of the data is known in advance, as is the purpose for which the data
will be used. Purposes of traditional applications requiring (context) data are
atomic in the sense that it is clearly known when purposes are fulfilled or not.
For applications which will use context data to learn, infer, and thus to become
smarter, it is not clear when such a purpose has been fulfilled, in other words,
purposes are non-atomic. It is even unclear which services and applications will
use the context data in the future.
For static databases containing large datasets with privacy sensitive data
(like medical data), anonymization can be used to prevent disclosure of individ-
ual privacy sensitive data [9–11]. However, anonymization does not always give
adequate privacy protection to everyone, and the usability of the data becomes
sometimes lower than needed because individual privacy concerns and personal
interests are not taken into account. Xiao et al [12] recognize this problem and
propose to personalize the anonymization of privacy sensitive data.
The nature of data used in the ambient smart environments is different and
more dynamic than that of traditional static data. The amount of smartness of
applications is bound to the quantity and quality of the data they can use. The
more accurate the data is, and the more data has been gathered from a certain
individual, the better a smart application can learn from that data without user
interaction [13]. The challenge is to find the best balance between the quality
and quantity of data at the one side, and the privacy sensitivity of the data at
the other side.
2 Motivation
Consider a working environment where employees can access the Internet and
rank their visited websites. These Internet browsing behaviors are monitored
and recorded in a database. Employees can query the database to find interesting
websites based on the ranking, and discuss with other employees who have visited
and ranked the websites. However, because the starting and end times when an
employee made a website visit are also recorded, it is possible to deduce the
duration that an employee spends on the Internet per day. Thus, most employees
may not want the system to record such sensitive information in the database
although the employees do benefit from the offered smart query services. To
compromise the smartness and privacy requirements, a self-regulation of sensitive
information could be like: one hour/day later, degrade the employee id to his/her
group id or even faculty id. In this way, s/he can still use such a query service as
“give me interesting websites visited by the people from the database group last
week”.
3 Approach
We let people (the authors of monitored events) specify Life-Cycle Policies which
will be bound to the acquired sensitive data [14]. Events are monitored and
bound to a context tuple, which could contain author, location, time et cetera.
This data is stored in a privacy aware context database system, which degrades
the data progressively according to the policy. This way, context history can be
considered as events (like a door has been opened) bound to attributes describ-
ing those events. The context values exhibit a certain level of accuracy based
on domain generalization graphs. Such generalization graphs together form a
n-dimensional space, in which each dimension represents the accuracy of an at-
tribute of the original data tuple. We consider that those levels of accuracy
can be classified given the privacy of the information they represent, such that
all possible combinations of accuracies form a n-dimensional cube. A life-cycle
policy can be viewed as a path specification in this cube. Triggered by events
(we consider both time and contextual events), the accuracy of context tuples
progressively decreases when specified conditions are satisfied.
4 Case Study
A prototype of a system which monitors the Internet browsing behavior of users
has been implemented. Websites visited by users will be monitored, enabling
smart services like ranking websites, contacting users of the same interests, find-
ing interesting websites visited by members of a certain group, calculation of
anonymized statistics, and so on. From the privacy perspective, collecting this
data (including times when people were active on the Internet) makes it for ma-
licious parties possible to deduce (for the user) confronting information. Users
can specify their life-cycle policies (e.g., degrade time to hour and person id to
group after one hour, degrade URL to category after one month, see Figure 1),
which are attached with the data and will be stored and executed within a pri-
vacy aware context database. By specifying a life-cycle policy, users are sure that
data which has been degraded can no longer be misused by malicious parties.
Hence, the amount of smartness is reduced to decrease the possibility of misusing
the data, consequently increasing privacy.
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Fig. 1. A LCP example with states (time, id, url) where φ stands for a deleted (or
completely degraded) value
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